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Abstract  
This paper investigates the main determinants of Telecommunications demand for 
European Union (EU) countries using a panel data set for 19 EU countries over the 
period 1991-2010, capturing the years before and after the liberalization process.  The 
goal is to clarify whether any changes in the demand of Telecommunications, as 
expressed by volume of traffic in local, mobile and international market segments, are 
attributed to regulatory process or to some other major drivers, taking also into 
account the relevant price elasticities.  It turns out that the regulatory process does not 
seem to have significant impact on demand for Telecommunications services for the 
first period of liberalization.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The Telecommunications sector in Europe has undergone substantial regulatory and 
institutional reorganizations over the last two decades.  Specifically, the European 
Union (EU) has issued several directives (1998/84/EC, 2002/21/EC and 
2009/140/EC) in order to promote effective competition in each market segment of 
the sector.  The primary goal of these Directives was to establish a common 
regulatory framework in Telecommunications within the EU countries, although, in 
practice, the implementation process varied considerably across member states.   
 As a result, the Telecommunications industry in EU has changed drastically, in 
terms of the intensity of competition, moving from a pure monopolistic environment 
to a regulated regime, where this regulatory process was controlled by National 
Regulatory Authorities, known as NRAs (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989).  Indeed, up 
to the early ‘90s the Telecommunications sector in Europe was governed by vertically 
integrated state-owned companies, whereas after this period several policy actions 
have been taken to facilitate regulation in terms of formulating prices and revenues to 
meet social and macroeconomic goals (Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2001).  The 
liberalization of the industry was a necessary tool to eliminate distortions, generated 
by the Public Telecommunications Operators (PTOs) that failed to meet social goals, 
and to enhance competition in order to provide better quality of services at lower 
prices (Newbery, 2002).  Meanwhile, the demand for Telecommunications services 
has overall increased over the last few years, without being able though to determine 
whether this increase is due to market opening or to other macroeconomic and 
demographic factors, such as economic activity, population density, technology and 
human needs.   
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 These two fundamental characteristics of the Telecommunications sector, i.e., 
the regulatory process and all determinants of demand, gave researchers the incentive 
to analyze and investigate the behavior of the industry.  For example, Laffont and 
Tirole (1993 & 2000) focused their research on regulation and they concluded that a 
good regulatory framework requires cost and demand information.  Other studies 
examined the impact of structural reforms, such as regulation, competition and 
privatization, on telecommunications performance, see for example Agiakloglou and 
Polemis (2017) and Wallsten (2001), whereas several other studies attempted to 
analyze the Telecommunications demand using different empirical approaches, see 
for example, Agiakloglou and Karkalakos (2007), Agiakloglou and Yiannelis (2005), 
Madden and Savage (2000), Wright (1999), Garin Munoz and Perez Amaral (1998), 
Sandbach (1996), Acton and Vogelsand (1992) and Bewley and Fiebig (1988).  
Clearly, determining demand conditions for Telecommunications is not only 
important for the operating companies but it is also essential for the NRAs.  Existing 
companies need to know how their demand is formulated to design their strategies for 
their short run and long run internal and market goals, whereas NRAs need to know 
market conditions to pursue policies and set rules regarding the structure, the conduct 
and the performance of the industry.   
 As it is known, demand conditions for Telecommunications services are 
determines by volume of traffic of calls in each market segment and prices (see for 
example Squire, 1973 and Rohlfs, 1974) as well as by several other macro and micro 
economic factors, discussed in detail by Taylor (1994).  Hence, it is very interesting to 
assess the impact of regulation, competition and privatization on Telecommunications 
demand for EU countries before and after the liberalization period.  The aim of this 
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study is to clarify whether the deregulation process has affected volume of calls in 
three market segments, such as local, mobile and international calls.    
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the data and the 
variables used in the relevant econometric methodology.  Section 3 reports and 
analyzes the empirical results, whereas the concluding remarks as well as some policy 
implications are portrayed in Section 4.    
 
 
2.  DATA AND MODEL 
 
We consider volume of calls as the main response variable to study demand for 
Telecommunications for three market segments such as: a) local, measured by fixed to 
fixed telephone traffic in minutes (LOCAL), b) mobile, measured by domestic mobile 
telephone traffic in minutes (MOB) and c) international, measured by total 
international outgoing fixed telephone traffic in minutes (INTER).  These variables 
are obtained from the World Telecommunications / ICT Indicators database (June 
2014) published by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for 19 EU 
countries over the period 1991 – 2010.1   
 The explanatory variables used to identify the behavior of these response 
variables are categorized in two sets: a) structural reform variables and b) 
macroeconomic and demographic variables.  The first set of explanatory variables 
tries to capture the impact of structural reforms, such as regulation, competition and 
privatization, on the volume of Telecommunications services.  For this reason we use: 
a) for regulation the Regulatory Reform Index (RRI), an index that measures the level 
                                                   
1 The E.U. countries are the following: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.   
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of regulation in Telecommunications for each country, taking values from 0 to 6, 
meaning perfectly deregulated market to totally regulated market respectively, b) for 
privatization a dummy variable (PRIV) taking the value of one when the percentage 
of shares in the PTO owned by the government is less than 50% and zero otherwise 
and c) for competition three dummy variables (COMP_LOCAL, COMP_MOB and 
COMP_INTER) accounting for the competitive conditions prevailing in local-trunk, 
mobile and international market segments, respectively, taking the value of one if 
competition exists in each of the three market segments and zero otherwise.  The data 
for all of the above variables is obtained directly from the OECD regulation database.  
It is interesting to point out that the RRI index is formed according to the 
methodology of Conway and Nicoletti (2006) capturing several elements of market 
structure and it has been used in several other empirical studies (see, for example, Li 
and Lyons, 2012, Pompei, 2013, Nesta et al, 2014).   
 The second set of variables includes some macroeconomic and demographic 
variables such as: a) the FRASER index, b) the number of active subscribers per 100 
inhabitants for local-fixed and mobile market segments, i.e., F_SUBS and M_SUBS 
respectively, and c) population density (POP).  Specifically, the FRASER index is a 
very important measure that declares the prevailing degree of economic risk in each 
country.  This index takes values from 0 to 10, with the highest value indicating less 
economic risk, and it is generated as a weighted average of five main macroeconomic 
factors such as: i) the size of government, ii) the legal system and property rights, iii) 
the access to sound money, iv) the freedom to trade internationally and v) the 
regulation of credit, labor and business (see Gwartney et al., 2012).  Data for the 
FRASER index and for the aforementioned demographic variables is drawn from the 
 6 
FRASER Institute and from the World Development Indicators Database available 
from the World Bank respectively.   
 The model adopted for this study is given by the following equation:   
0 1 2 3 4it itjit it it t i itY a a RRI a COMP a PRIV a X u             (1) 
where all non-index variables are in natural logarithms, j = 1, 2, 3 denotes the three 
dependent variables, i.e., LOCAL, MOB and INTER, for all countries (i) at time t and 
the errors (εit) are uncorrelated to each other.  Xit is a vector of control variables 
described above. 2  The γt stands for the time fixed effects and ui are the country fixed 
effects that control for differences across countries (see Agiakloglou and Polemis, 
2017). 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Model (1) is estimated using OLS with fixed effects for each of the three market 
segments and the results are reported on Table 1.3  As can be seen from column one of 
this table none of the three structural reform variables affects the volume of fixed 
telephone traffic in the local market segment, since their coefficients are not 
statistically significant.  This result denotes that the deregulation process does not 
affect the volume of calls for this specific market segment. 4  One possible explanation 
for this finding can be attributed to the fact that the demand for this particular segment 
of the Telecommunications market has not been increased, since other modes of 
                                                   
2 It is interesting to indicate that several other macroeconomic variables are included to model (1), such 
as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), Exports to GDP (EX) and the 
level of Total Employment (EMPL), but these variables did not produce significant results for all cases 
and therefore have been excluded.   
3 Model (1) is also estimated with random effects, but the Hausman (1978) test did not accept the null 
hypothesis of these effects.   
4 Indeed, from the analysis of raw data it is evident that the mean volume traffic for all EU countries 
before the liberalization period is slightly larger than its counterpart after the liberalization period.   
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Telecommunications have been risen absorbing part of this volume of traffic.  Hence, 
the volume of fixed telephone traffic is affected by the other variables included in 
model (1).   
 Specifically, the number of active subscribers per 100 inhabitants for fixed 
telephone lines has a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of traffic 
volume for the local market segment.  However, its magnitude is rather small, i.e., 
equal to 3.9%, meaning that a 100% increase (decrease) of the number of subscribers 
will lead to a roughly 4% increase (decrease) of the traffic volume, ceteris paribus.  
This small magnitude is probably attributed to the fact that subscribers tend to apply 
for fixed line connections not basically to make telephone calls, but to obtain other 
high value added complementary services bundled to a fixed line.  Therefore, it is 
more important for firms, in terms of pricing, to charge low prices for fixed telephony 
and high prices for all other complementary services, such as internet and broadband 
connections, as well as cable TV.   
 On the other hand, the other two variables, population density and FRASER 
index, have a negative and statistically significant impact on the level of traffic 
volume for fixed telephony.  Clearly, as population density increases, the volume of 
fixed telephone traffic decreases, indicating the existence of a substitution effect, i.e., 
people tend to substitute fixed telephony with other more advanced ways of 
communications, such as mobile telephony.  Similarly, as the economic risk of a 
country decreases, meaning that the FRASER index increases, people tend to use 
more often other means of communications rather than fixed telephony, such as 
broadband services.   
 Column two of Table 1 reports the results obtained from the estimation of model 
(1) for the mobile market segment.  As can be seen from this column the structural 
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reform variables provide mixed results.  In particular, the level of competition has 
positive and statistically significant effect on volume, although, its magnitude is 
small, relative to the constant term, since it is a dummy variable, indicating that 
competition has minor impact on the volume of mobile telephony.  Similarly, 
privatization has positive and statistically significant effect on volume with an 
estimate of 0.14, lower than the 0.51 estimate of competition, indicating that more 
privatization does not necessarily lead to a large increase in volume.  On the contrary, 
the volume of mobile telephony is not affected by the level of regulation, since its 
coefficient is not statistically significant.  Perhaps, one possible explanation for this 
finding is attributed to the fact that the market for mobile telephony has opened 
instantly without the necessary regulatory enforcement period.   
 The other three variables, such as the number of mobile subscribers, the 
population density and the FRASER index, do statistically significant affect the 
behavior of the dependent variable.  For example, the volume of mobile telephony is 
positively related to the number of mobile subscribers, as expected and similarly 
found in the case of local telephony.  Likewise, population density and FRASER 
index have positive impact on the volume of mobile telephony, a result though that it 
is in alignment with the one obtained for fixed telephony.  This finding supports the 
argument that people tend to use more mobile telephony, instead of conventional 
means of communication, such as fixed telephony, as economic activity grows along 
with the population density.  It is also interesting to point out that the magnitude of 
the coefficient of FRASER index is significantly larger than the estimates of the 
coefficients of the other two variables, such as M_SUB and POP, a finding that 
highlights the importance of a stable economic environment, mostly evident in EU.   
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 Finally, column three of Table 1 depicts the estimated results by using the 
international volume traffic as the dependent variable.  The effect of structural reform 
variables on international calls is different than the one obtained from the other two 
market segments.  In this case, only the level of competition has statistically 
significant effect on volume of international calls, while the other two structural 
reform variables, such as privatization and regulation, do not play any role in 
determining the volume of this market segment.  This finding can be justified by the 
fact that it is relatively easy for potential firms to enter the market and provide 
international calls at competitive prices.  However, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient of competition is relatively small, as indicated in the other two market 
segments, revealing that competition has limited impact on international volume 
traffic.   
 The number of fixed subscribers, the population density and the FRASER index 
have statistically significant impact on the volume of international calls, as has been 
found for the other two market segments.  However, all estimates of their coefficients 
are positive, compared to the fixed telephony at the local market, indicating that as 
economy grows, along with population density and the number of subscribers, the 
traffic for international calls increases.  This result is attributed to the fact that people 
prefer to make their international calls through fixed line connections since calls are 
typically less expensive than calls made through mobile telephony.  Similarly to the 
mobile market the magnitude of the coefficient of the FRASER index is substantially 
larger than the other two control variables, meaning that the level of the economic 
activity of a country is more is more important than the number of subscribers and 
population density.   
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 Clearly, to support further the findings of this study a complimentary analysis is 
implemented in terms of estimating own and cross price elasticies for Local and 
Mobile market segments in order to obtain robust and meaningful results using only 
prices for Fixed and Mobile calls as regressors in model (1).  For this reason we use 
the price of a three minute local call to a fixed telephone line at pick rate, named as 
PRL, and the mobile cellular prepaid price of a three minute local call, at pick on net 
rate, named as PRM, as a proxy variable of a regular price of three minutes mobile 
call.  The values of these prices are obtained from the World Telecommunications / 
ICT Indicators database (June 2014) published by the ITU and the estimated own and 
cross price elesticities for fixed and mobile telephony are reported on Table 2.5   
 In particular, column one of Table 2 reports the estimated results of regressing 
volume of fixed telephony on its own price and on the price of mobile telephony.  The 
own price elasticity of fixed telephony is equal to -0.53, whereas the cross price 
elasticity of fixed telephony using prices of mobile telephony is equal to 0.15.  All 
estimates are statistically significant and have the anticipated signs.  More 
specifically, the absolute value of the own price elasticity of fixed telephony is less 
than one, indicating inelastic demand, whereas the positive cross price elasticity 
suggests the existence of a substitution effect.  However, the magnitude of the cross 
price elasticity is small, close to zero, revealing that a price increase of the mobile 
telephony has a minor and negligible effect on the demand for fixed telephony.   
 In contrast, the own price elasticity of mobile telephony is equal to -0.82, 
whereas the cross price elasticity of mobile to fixed telephony equals to 0.85, as can 
been seen from column two of Table 2.  These results are obtained by regressing 
volume of mobile telephony on its own price and on the price of fixed telephony and 
                                                   
5 Data for uniformly defined prices of international calls was not available.   
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all estimates are statistically significant and have the proper signs.  The own price 
elasticity of mobile telephony is in absolute terms less than one, indicating also an 
inelastic demand for this market, whereas the cross price elasticity is positive, 
declaring the existence of a substitution effect.   
 Nevertheless, important results emerge by comparing the estimates of own and 
cross price elasticities obtained by the two market segments.  First, the magnitude of 
the own price elasticity of mobile telephony is larger in absolute terms than the one 
obtained in fixed telephony.  This finding can be explained by the fact that fixed 
subscribers are less active to change provider than mobile subscribers.  On the other 
hand, the magnitude of the cross price elasticity of mobile telephony is almost six 
times larger than its counterpart cross price elasticity for fixed telephony, indicating 
that the substitution effect is more sensitive towards the mobile rather than the fixed 
telephony market to price changes.   
 
 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
This paper studied the main determinants of Telecommunications demand for three 
market segments (local, mobile and international) before and after the the 
liberalization process of the industry across 19 EU countries.  The aim of this research 
was to explore the impact of structural reform variables, such as, regulation, 
competition and privatization, on traffic volume of calls in each of the three market 
segments taking also into account some other demographic and macroeconomic 
factors.   
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 The empirical findings based on a panel fixed effects static model suggest that 
structural reform variables do not have uniform impact on volume of calls in all of the 
three examined market segments.  In particular, for the local market none of the three 
structural reform variables play significant role in determining the volume of calls.  
On the contrary, competition and privatization do affect positively and statistically 
significant the volume of mobile calls, whereas the level of regulation does not 
influence at all the volume of this market.  Finally, for the international market only 
the level of competition has positive and statistically significant effect on volume of 
calls compared to the other two structural reform variables.  
 Moreover, the aforementioned findings are in alignment with the existing 
economic conditions.  The local market seems to remain unaltered by the 
liberalization process, simply because the tendency was to move away from this 
market to some other niche markets, such as mobile.  On the other hand, the mobile 
and the international markets have been affected mainly by competition due to 
gradually decreases in prices.  The switching of the demand from fixed to mobile 
telephony can also be supported by the positive sign of the cross price elasticity.  This 
result strongly suggests the existence of a substitution effect between fixed and 
mobile demand, favorable towards mobile telephony, revealing the robustness of the 
empirical findings.   
 Finally, all other macroeconomic and demographic variables do statistically 
significant affect the volume of calls in all three market segments, but, to some extent, 
at a different impact.  As it is showed, the number of subscribers affects positively the 
volume of calls in all markets.  However, the population density and the level of 
economic risk, have a negative impact on the level of traffic volume only for fixed 
telephony at the local market segment, a result that can be attributed to the fact that as 
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economy and technology grow the relative importance of fixed telephony to the 
overall Telecommunications sector decreases. 
 Hence, it turns out that the regulatory process did not have substantial impact 
on Telecommunications demand for the first period of liberalization.  The demand for 
Telecommunications for the three examined market segments seems to be affected by 
other factors and, therefore, policy makers should not pursue strategies towards to a 
more regulated industry.  The opening of the Telecommunications sector, due to 
regulatory efforts, gave the incentive to several companies to enter the market offering 
products and services at competitive prices.  As a result these companies gained 
market shares from the incumbent without though being able to increase the demand 
for Telecommunications in the EU.   
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List of Tables  
 
 
Table 1: Fixed effects results  
Coefficients  Fixed 
Telephony  
Mobile  
Telephony 
International  
Telephony 
Constant 
27.765*** 
(40.557) 
16.038*** 
(15.153) 
13.552*** 
(15.298) 
RRI 
0.015 
(1.074) 
0.001 
(0.051) 
0.010* 
(0.467) 
COMP_LOCAL 
-0.053 
(-1.121) 
- - 
COMP_MOB - 
0.511*** 
(4.696) 
- 
COMP_INTER - - 
0.135** 
(2.320) 
PRIV 
-0.009 
(-0.159) 
0.144*** 
(2.448) 
-0.005 
(-0.092) 
F_SUBS 
0.039*** 
(15.440) 
- 
0.035**** 
(10.453) 
M_SUBS - 
0.021*** 
(26.654) 
- 
POP 
-0.022*** 
(-8.493) 
0.019*** 
(3.648) 
0.025*** 
(5.845) 
FRASER 
-0.364*** 
(-5.431) 
0.243*** 
(3.403) 
0.220*** 
(3.576) 
Diagnostics  
Observations 180 207 335 
Adjusted R2   0.98 0.97 0.94 
S.E of regression 0.22 0.28 0.29 
F-statistic   728.16*** 
[0.00] 
360.91*** 
[0.00] 
222.74*** 
[0.00] 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are the p-values. Significant at 
***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.  
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Table 2: Own and Cross Price Elasticities 
Coefficients  Fixed 
Telephony  
Mobile  
Telephony 
Constant 
23.202*** 
(196.409) 
24.245*** 
(75.086) 
PRL 
-0.531*** 
(-3.728) 
0.855*** 
(4.938) 
PRM 
0.158*** 
(2.833) 
-0. 822*** 
(-6.367) 
Diagnostics    
Observations 146 157 
Adjusted R2   0.95 0.75 
S.E of regression 0.29 0.77 
F-statistic   170.43*** 
[0.00] 
24.73*** 
[0.00] 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are the p-values. Significant at 
***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.  
 
 
